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COMMENTS
You HURT MY FEELINGS,
Now PAY UP:
SHOULD OBJECTIVE EVIDENCE BE
REQUIRED TO SUPPORT CLAIMS FOR
EMOTIONAL DISTRESS DAMAGES IN
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION CASES?
Imagine that you are a mid-level manager for a large, interna-
tional corporation. You have been with The Company for over ten
years and have consistently received satisfactory to superior per-
formance evaluations. According to The Company's policies and
procedures, you should be eligible to receive any one of several
promotions. However, before you are promoted, a new upper-
level management team is put in place. The members of this team
make derogatory comments about your race, which is different
from theirs, and exclude you from management meetings, which
you have previously attended. Additionally, they assign some of
your existing clients to other managers because they supposedly
fear that you favor clients that are of your race. Your remaining
clients are given company publications omitting your name and are
told that all managers have been replaced, even though you still
manage their accounts. Despite being the most productive man-
ager at The Company, you do not receive bonuses or promotions
that other, less-qualified managers receive. You are finally fired,
in public, for handing out business cards while on vacation with
former coworkers who now work for The Company's competitors.
The Company sends letters to your foreign clients, telling them
you were fired. While most terminated employees are given a sev-
erance package and time to take home their personal belongings
before leaving, you are not. Instead, your company car is immedi-
ately confiscated, your salary is suspended, and The Company re-
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tains your personal items. You subsequently sue The Company for
race discrimination.
At trial, you present sufficient evidence to prove The Com-
pany and upper-management discriminated against you based on
your race. You present evidence of your lost wages, which the
jury awards to you. You also claim that you suffered emotional
distress as a result of The Company's treatment of you. You tes-
tify that you were troubled by your termination and that you could
not believe you were fired. You also testify that your reputation
and dignity have been damaged by the way you were treated. You
offer no other evidence to support your claim for emotional dis-
tress. Is this testimony alone sufficient to support a jury award for
emotional distress damages, or will you need to present some ob-
jective evidence of your emotional injuries? The answer, at least
according to some courts, may depend on the court hearing your
case.
The preceding hypothetical is based on the recent case, Zhang
v. American Gem Seafoods, Inc. 1 There, the terminated employee,
Zhang, also testified 2 that people in his hometown in China
thought "there must be something wrong, because [Zhang] is doing
something wrong in the States."3 He further stated that his busi-
ness future in China was ruined because "your reputation and your
credibility is the key."4 In determining that this testimony alone
was sufficient to support an award of over $100,000 for emotional
damages, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
noted that "[w]hile objective evidence requirements may exist in
other circuits, such a requirement is not imposed by the case law in
... the Ninth Circuit, or the Supreme Court."5 Thus the court con-
cluded that in some circuits, including the Ninth Circuit, a plain-
tiff's testimony, by itself, is sufficient to support an award for
emotional distress damages in employment discrimination cases.
The court felt that in other circuits, however, a plaintiff may also
be required to present some form of objective evidence of his emo-
tional injuries in order to prevail on a claim for emotional distress. 6
While the court in Zhang stated that the Supreme Court does
not require objective evidence in such cases, the Supreme Court
1 339 F.3d 1020 (9th Cir. 2003).
2 In addition to the testimony presented in the preceding hypothetical.
3 Zhang, 339 F.3d at 1040.
4 Id.
5 Id. (quoting Passantino v. Johnson & Johnson Consumer Prods., Inc., 212 F.3d 493, 513
(9th Cir. 2000)).
6 See, e.g., Patrolmen's Benevolent Ass'n v. City of New York, 310 F.3d 43, 55 (2d Cir.
2002), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 2076 (2003); see also discussion infra Part I.A.
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has not actually directly addressed this issue.7 Thus, the circuit
and district courts have been left to fashion their own rules regard-
ing the standard of proof necessary to sustain damages for emo-
tional distress. The results have been inconsistent, with no clear
guidelines for determining how much, if any, objective evidence is
needed in any particular situation.
This Comment argues that objective evidence is not, and
should not be, necessary to support an award of damages for emo-
tional distress that results from employment discrimination. Part I
discusses the United States Supreme Court decision in Carey v.
Piphus,8 to which most courts look in trying to determine the suffi-
ciency of emotional distress evidence. Part II explores the differ-
ent approaches taken by the circuit courts and by the Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") regarding objective
evidence and concludes that, contrary to the Ninth Circuit's asser-
tion in Zhang, few circuits actually require objective evidence to
prove emotional distress claims. Part III examines how emotional
distress evidence is handled in tort cases outside the employment
context and, again, determines that objective evidence is not a re-
quirement in such cases. 9 Finally, this Comment concludes that
objective evidence should not be necessary to support an award for
emotional distress damages in employment discrimination cases.
I. CAREY V. PIPHUS
The case to which most courts look in determining the suffi-
ciency of the evidence regarding emotional distress is Carey v.
Piphus.
A. Facts of the Case
Carey involved a freshman at a Chicago high school, Jarius
Piphus, who was suspended from school for allegedly smoking
marijuana on school grounds during school hours. The principal
claimed he saw Piphus and another student sharing an "irregularly
shaped" cigarette, though the principal never saw the cigarette up
close. Piphus, supported by his family, insisted that he had merely
7 Instead, the Court has noted in passing that injuries from emotional distress are "essen-
tially subjective" but "may be evidenced by one's conduct and observed by others." Carey v.
Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 264 n.20 (1978). Unfortunately, the Court has not clarified whether
purely subjective evidence, in the form of the plaintiffs testimony, would be sufficient evidence
of such injury.
8 435 U.S. 247 (1978).
9 For purposes of this Comment, such cases include those where a tort claim for emo-
tional distress is made separately from, and in addition to, an employment discrimination claim
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 or 42 U.S.C. § 1981.
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been smoking a regular cigarette. Nevertheless, he was suspended
from school for twenty days without a hearing to determine
whether or not he was actually smoking marijuana. His mother
subsequently filed suit against the principal, the superintendent of
schools, and the school board under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ("Section
1983"),1° alleging that Piphus had been suspended without due
process in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment."
Similarly, Silas Brisco, a sixth grade student at a Chicago
elementary school, was suspended from school for twenty days
because he refused to remove his earring, in violation of a school
policy prohibiting males from wearing earrings. Brisco was sus-
pended after his mother supported his refusal to remove the ear-
ring. Like Piphus, Brisco's mother subsequently filed suit against
the principal, the superintendent of schools, and the school board
under Section 1983. The two cases were consolidated for trial.'
2
B. The Court's Approach to Emotional Distress.
Both students claimed that damages for emotional distress
caused by the due process deprivations could be presumed, and
therefore did not present any evidence regarding any emotional
distress they had suffered. The United States Supreme Court held
that damages for emotional distress are available for a constitu-
tional violation only if the plaintiff provides evidence that he suf-
fered actual injury as a result of the violation. 3 The Court found
that distress14 is a "personal injury familiar to the law" that is gen-
erally proved by showing the nature of the harm, the circumstances
under which it occurred, and the consequent effect on the plain-
tiff.15  Emotional distress injuries cannot be presumed to result
from a violation of the plaintiff's rights, as these plaintiffs had
'0 Section 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or us-
age, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress ....
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000).
1 Carey, 435 U.S. at 249-50.
12 Id. at 250-51.
"3 Id. at 255 ("[D]amages are available under [§ 1983] for actions 'found .. . to have been
violative of ... Constitutional rights and to have caused compensable injury. ... ') (citations
omitted).
14 Distress includes "mental suffering or emotional anguish." Id. at 264 n.20.
'5 Id. at 263-64.
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claimed. Instead, there must be "proof that such injury actually
was caused."
16
In making this determination, the Court noted that emotional
injuries are "essentially subjective," but that they are generally
proven "by one's conduct and observed by others."' 7  Unfortu-
nately, this statement could have two meanings. It could mean that
a plaintiff must present evidence of his distress along with evi-
dence that this distress was observed by others.' 8 On the other
hand, it may be sufficient for a plaintiff to testify as to how his
distress manifested itself as long as he testifies that the distress
was so severe as to be observable by others. The only guidance
the Court gave was to note that the jury must be "guided by appro-
priate instructions" and that "competent evidence" must be pre-
sented to support the claim. 19
By stating that the claim must be supported by "competent
evidence," without more, the Court implied that any evidence,
whether subjective or objective, is sufficient to prove emotional
injury, as long as such evidence convinces the trier of fact by a
preponderance of the evidence that the injury actually occurred.
This view is supported by the Court's recognition that emotional
injuries are "essentially subjective" and that they may be proved
by "one's conduct and observed by others. 2 ° If, after noting that
emotional injuries are subjective in nature, the Court wanted to
impose a different standard of proof on the plaintiff, such as re-
quiring objective evidence in addition to the plaintiff's own testi-
mony, it easily could have done so. 2 1 Instead, the Court used lan-
guage indicating that objective evidence is one method for proving
emotional injuries, but it is not the only method available. Thus,
where a plaintiff's testimony is sufficiently detailed to convince a
jury by a preponderance of the evidence that an emotional injury
occurred as a result of the wrongful conduct, that testimony should
be sufficient to justify an award of damages for that emotional dis-
tress.
16 Id.
17 Id. at 264 n.20.
Is Such evidence could take the form of corroborating testimony of family, friends, or co-
workers.
'9 Carey, 435 U.S. at 264 n.20 ("[A]n award of damages must be supported by competent
evidence concerning the injury.").
20 Id.
21 For example, the Court could have specified that emotional injuries must be proven by
evidence of the observations of others.
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II. CAREY HAS CREATED CONFUSION AMONG
THE LOWER COURTS.
The Supreme Court's holding in Carey, while concerning
claims under Section 1983, has been applied to claims of emo-
tional distress resulting from alleged employment discrimination
under both Title V1122 and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 ("Section 198199).23
Unfortunately, the Court's failure to clarify whether objective evi-
dence is a necessity or merely an option for proving emotional
damages has created great confusion among the lower courts. This
confusion has caused courts to interpret earlier decisions as requir-
ing objective evidence when those decisions are really based on
the sufficiency of the evidence presented, whether subjective or
objective. For example, the Zhang court noted, after referring to
Price v. City of Charlotte,24 that "objective evidence requirements
may exist in other circuits," but not in the Ninth Circuit.25 The
clear implication in the court's statement is that the Fourth Cir-
cuit's decision in Price requires objective evidence to support
claims of emotional distress. However, that simply is not the case.
Instead, the Price court recognized that plaintiff testimony alone
26
may not be sufficient to support an award of emotional damages.
The court did not state that plaintiff testimony is never sufficient to
support an emotional damage award in the absence of objective
evidence. The Ninth Circuit is not alone. As demonstrated below,
other courts and commentators have similarly declared that courts
require objective evidence when in fact those courts have no such
requirement.
A. A Few Courts Purportedly Require Objective Evidence.
The following cases are a few of those in which objective evi-
dence is purportedly required. In each case, however, an argument
can be made that the courts do not actually require objective evi-
dence to support an award of emotional distress damages. Instead,
the courts are generally noncommittal, basing their decisions on
the facts of each case.
2 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2000). Title VII prohibits discrimination in employ-
ment based on race, sex, religion, color, or national origin. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2.
23 See, e.g., Patterson v. PHP Healthcare Corp., 90 F.3d 927, 940 (5th Cir. 1996) ("[W]e
read Carey to require a plaintiff to present the same level of competent evidence under a Title
VII emotional distress claim as is required to sustain a finding for emotional distress under
§§ 1981 and 1983."). Section 1981 prohibits racial discrimination in the making and enforce-
ment of contracts, including employment contracts. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1981a.
24 93 F.3d 1241 (4th Cir. 1996).
25 Zhang v. Am. Gem Seafoods, Inc., 339 F.3d 1020, 1040 (9th Cir. 2003).
26 See Price, 93 F.3d at 1251.
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1. The Second Circuit Comes Closest to Requiring Objective
Evidence.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in
Patrolmen's Benevolent Ass'n v. City of New York,27 comes the
closest to actually requiring objective evidence. In upholding a
jury award of $50,000 to each plaintiff for emotional damages re-
sulting from alleged race discrimination, the court stated that a
"plaintiff's subjective testimony, standing alone, is generally in-
sufficient to sustain an award of emotional distress damages. 28
The court noted that the lower court's jury instruction stated that a
plaintiff, in order to be eligible for emotional distress damages,
must either present evidence of "physical manifestations of emo-
tional suffering" or corroborating testimony of the emotional suf-
fering.29 However, medical expert testimony is not required, even
though it is likely to be helpful. 30 Thus, while the court seems to
prefer corroborating testimony, its use of the word "generally" im-
plies that it may not always require such testimony if the plaintiff's
testimony is sufficiently detailed, especially if the emotional dis-
tress has caused the plaintiff to suffer physically as well.
2. At First Glance, the Third Circuit May Appear to Require
Objective Evidence, but It Does Not.
Spence v. Board of Education31 is another case where, at first
reading, it appears that the court requires objective evidence in
order for an award of emotional distress damages to be upheld.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed
remittitur of emotional distress damages of $22,060 where plain-
tiff's evidence consisted mainly of her own testimony regarding
her depression and humiliation resulting from a job transfer.
Plaintiff also testified that "she had lost her motive to be crea-
tive. 32 The court noted that there was no evidence that the plain-
tiff's peers held her in any less esteem, nor was there evidence that
she suffered physically as a result of her distress.33 The court also
27 310 F.3d 43 (2d Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 2076 (2003).
28 Id. at 55 (citing several other Second Circuit cases).
29 Id. at 49 n.4, 50. The lower court specified that a plaintiffs testimony regarding physi-
cal manifestations of emotional suffering would not have to be corroborated in order to support
emotional distress damages. Id. at 49 n.4. The lower court also specified that these require-
ments only applied to constitutional claims arising under Section 1981 and Section 1983, not to
claims arising under Title VII. Id.
30 See id.
31 806 F.2d 1198 (3d Cir. 1986).
32 Id. at 1201.
33 Id.
20031
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
noted the plaintiff's failure to present any evidence that she sought
psychiatric counseling.34
Since the plaintiff remained employed and did not suffer a re-
duction in pay, the court determined that "neither the circum-
stances nor the testimony established that there was a reasonable
probability, rather than a mere possibility, that damages due to
emotional distress were in fact incurred as a result of the trans-
fer.",35 The court concluded that, "on the facts of this case, the dis-
trict court did not err in finding that the evidence was too specula-
tive to support a $22,060 award of emotional distress damages. ''36
In reaching this conclusion, the court expressly refused to decide
whether a plaintiff's testimony alone would ever be sufficient to
support an award for emotional distress. 37 Thus, the Third Circuit
does not necessarily require objective evidence to support an
award for emotional damages, but instead considers the merits of
the particular evidence presented in each case. By refusing to de-
cide the issue, the court specifically left open the possibility that a
plaintiff's testimony, in some situations, will be sufficient to sup-
port emotional distress damages.
3. Three Other Courts Are Cited as Requiring Objective Evidence
When They Really Do Not.
Courts in at least three other cases have been referred to as re-
quiring objective evidence when in fact they do not.38 In Patterson
v. PHP Healthcare Corp.,39 the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit vacated two emotional distress awards that had
been based solely on the two plaintiffs' testimony. The court
noted that the testimony did not meet "the specificity required by
Carey. 4 °  The court further stated that the required specificity
"may include corroborating testimony or medical or psychological
evidence in support of the damage award.",4 1 The court's use of
the word "may" indicates that such corroboration or medical evi-
dence is not a mandatory requirement for proving emotional dis-
4 Id.
35 Id. (internal quotation omitted).
36 Id. (emphasis added).
37 Id. ("We need not decide whether a verdict for emotional distress may ever be sup-
ported solely by a plaintiffs own testimony.").
38 At least one pair of commentators has represented that these three cases stand for the
proposition that a plaintiffs testimony, standing alone, is not sufficient to support more than a
nominal award for emotional distress damages. See JOEL WM. FRIEDMAN & GEORGE M.
STRICKLER, JR., THE LAW OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 577 (5th ed. 2001).
39 90 F.3d 927 (5th Cir. 1996).
40 Id. at 939.
4' Id. at 940 (emphasis added).
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tress, but may instead be necessary only when the plaintiff's testi-
mony is not detailed in terms of the nature and extent of the dis-
tress.42 The court solidified its view on this subject in a later case
in which it held a plaintiff's testimony, alone, to be sufficient to
support an award of damages. 3
Similarly, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit has been viewed as requiring objective evidence when it
really does not. In Fitzgerald v. Mountain States Telephone &
Telegraph Co.,44 the court vacated an award of emotional distress
damages as "clearly excessive" and remanded the case to the dis-
trict court for a new trial on the damages issue.45 The two plain-
tiffs had been awarded $250,000 each in emotional distress dam-
ages, where "[n]o treating physicians or psychologists testified and
both Plaintiffs continue[d] to work in their chosen field. 46  In-
stead, one plaintiff testified that she was "devastated," stripped of
her dignity, and suffered more frequent occurrences of stress-
related herpes simplex as a result of the alleged discrimination.47
The other plaintiff testified that he "felt angry and insulted, experi-
enced headaches and missed more than three weeks of work" be-
cause of the same discrimination.48
While it would appear that the court's decision to vacate the
award was based on the absence of corroborating testimony on be-
half of either plaintiff, a closer reading shows otherwise. The
court was actually concerned that the situation surrounding the
alleged racial incident 49 was itself an "incendiary climate" that
"originated from a variety of sources," not just the accused. 5° Be-
cause of the "hot button" issues involved in that situation, the
court felt that the damage awards had been "tainted by passion and
42 The court also stated that since one of the plaintiffs had "failed to present sufficient
competent testimony and/or other evidence to demonstrate the nature and extent of emotional
harm," her testimony alone failed to satisfy the Carey specificity requirement. Id. at 941 (em-
phasis added).
43 See Vadie v. Miss. State Univ., 218 F.3d 365, 376-77 (5th Cir. 2000) (stating that a
failure to provide medical evidence or corroborating testimony by witnesses is "not necessarily
fatal if the evidence is otherwise sufficient"); see also Brady v. Fort Bend County, 145 F.3d
691, 720 (5th Cir. 1998) ("Under Patterson it does not matter what type of evidence is used to
satisfy Carey's specificity requirement, so long as that standard is successfully met."); infra Part
l.B.
44 68 F.3d 1257 (10th Cir. 1995).
41 Id. at 1266.
46 Id. at 1265.
47 Id.
48 Id.
49 The two plaintiffs were participating in a diversity training session at the time of the in-
cident. See id. at 1260.
50 Id. at 1266.
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prejudice.' Without this passion and prejudice, it is not at all
clear that the court would have required objective evidence to sup-
port emotional distress damages.
Finally, in Vance v. Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph
Co., 52 the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Cir-
cuit's decision to affirm the district court's ruling, that $500,000 in
emotional distress damages was excessive, was not based on the
lack of evidence of emotional harm.53 Instead, the court was con-
cerned with causation, determining that the district judge had cor-
rectly taken into account the "other unpleasant factors in [plain-
tiff's] life which almost certainly contributed to her mental dis-
tress. 54 The court also noted that the plaintiff was not so emo-
tionally harmed that she could not work or lead a normal life.55
Based on these factors, the court agreed that the damages awarded
were grossly excessive. The court did not state, or even infer, that
plaintiff's testimony was insufficient to support any award for
emotional damages. Consequently, it is not at all clear that the
Eleventh Circuit requires objective evidence in order to sustain an
award for emotional damages.
B. Some Courts Clearly Do Not Require Objective Evidence.
Unlike the cases discussed supra, there are several cases in
which courts clearly do not require objective evidence. For exam-
ple, in Smith v. Northwest Financial Acceptance, Inc.,56 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit stated that the plain-
tiff's testimony, though not "exceedingly graphic or detailed,"
constituted substantial evidence when considered in light of the
totality of the circumstances of her case.57 The plaintiff testified
about the nature and extent of the emotional harm she suffered as a
result of the sexual harassment she suffered at work.58 The court
disagreed with the employer's argument that plaintiff was required
5I Id. The court noted that "the record may support a compensatory damage award." Id.
52 863 F.2d 1503 (1 lth Cir. 1989).
53 The only evidence presented at trial was the plaintiff's own testimony that she suffered
emotional distress due to an allegedly racially hostile work environment.
54 Vance, 863 F.2d at 1516.
53 Id.
56 129 F.3d 1408 (10th Cir. 1997).
57 Id. at 1416. The court did note that plaintiffs coworkers testified that she was "hurt,
visibly shaken, and on the verge of tears," though it only mentioned this in passing while noting
that other Tenth Circuit cases have not required any corroborating testimony. Id. (citing Fitz-
gerald v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 68 F.3d 1257, 1265-66 (10th Cir. 1995); Wulf v. City
of Wichita, 883 F.2d 842,875 (10th Cir. 1989)).
58 The nature of the harm included "nausea, migraines, humiliation, degradation, loss of
self-respect, sleeplessness, consumption of sleeping pills, frequent crying, loss of loan officer
career, and stress in Plaintiff's relationship with her daughter." Smith, 129 F.3d at 1416.
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to present medial testimony regarding her suffering, stating that
presenting such testimony is not the sole method of proving emo-
tional distress. Instead, the cumulative evidence, along with the
context of the offensive behavior that caused the harm, must be
considered.59 Considering plaintiff's testimony and the "intimate
office setting" in which the harassment occurred, the court held
that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the
employer's motion for remittitur.60  Clearly then, objective evi-
dence is not required for emotional damages to be awarded in the
Tenth Circuit.
As noted previously, the Fifth Circuit has made it clear that
objective evidence is not a requirement for obtaining a damage
award for emotional distress. In Brady v. Fort Bend County,61 the
court stated that a plaintiff's testimony alone may be sufficient to
support an emotional damage award when that testimony is "par-
ticularized and extensive, such that it speaks to the nature, extent,
and duration of the claimed emotional harm in a manner that por-
trays a specific and discernable injury.,62 The court determined
that the plaintiffs' one-word answers to leading questions regard-
ing their injuries were "vague, conclusory, and uncorroborated,"
and that under Carey,63 Patterson,64 and Price,65 the testimony was
insufficient to support an award for emotional distress. 66 The court
was careful to point out that it was not holding that a plaintiff
could never prove emotional distress through his own testimony.67
Thus, objective evidence is not a required element of a plaintiff's
emotional distress claim in the Fifth Circuit.
C. The EEOC Does Not Require Objective Evidence.
In 1992, the EEOC provided its position, in the form of an En-
forcement Guidance Decision, on the availability of compensatory
damages for emotional distress arising out of employment dis-
crimination. 68 Before setting forth the legal parameters for com-
puting emotional distress damages, the EEOC noted that compen-
satory damages, including those for emotional distress, may be
59 Id. at 1417.
6 Id.
61 145 F.3d 691 (5th Cir. 1998).
62 Id. at 720.
63 Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247 (1978).
64 Patterson v. PHP Healthcare Corp., 90 F.3d 927 (5th Cir. 1996).
65 Price v. City of Charlotte, 93 F.3d 1241 (4th Cir. 1996).
66 See Brady, 145 F.3d at 720.
67 Id.
68 Enforcement Guidance: Compensatory and Punitive Damages Available Under § 102 of
the Civil Rights Act of 1991, E.E.O.C. Decision No. 915.002 (July 14, 1992), 1992 WL 189089.
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awarded for "any proximate consequences which can be estab-
lished with requisite certainty., 69 The EEOC also confirmed that
emotional injury is not presumed to follow from a discriminatory
act. Instead, the existence, nature, and extent of the emotional in-
jury must be proved.7 ° Additionally, the EEOC recognized that
emotional injuries may manifest themselves in a variety of ways,
including anxiety, stress, humiliation, and excessive fatigue. 7' The
EEOC also gave examples of possible physical manifestations of
such injuries.72
While the EEOC "will typically require medical evidence of
emotional harm," it did recognize and accept that "evidence of
emotional harm may be established by testimony" and that a
"[p]laintiff's own testimony may be solely sufficient to establish
humiliation or mental distress. '73 The EEOC recommended, how-
ever, that the plaintiff would be wise, in conciliation negotiations,
to present corroborating testimony from coworkers, supervisors,
friends, or family, as the plaintiff's testimony alone in those situa-
tions may not be sufficient for emotional distress damages.74
Therefore, although objective evidence is recommended during the
conciliation process, the EEOC specifically does not require objec-
tive evidence in all situations, and recognizes that courts do not
require such evidence either.
III. EMOTIONAL DISTRESS CLAIMS OUTSIDE THE
EMPLOYMENT CONTEXT
Not only is objective evidence not generally required by
courts in determining whether emotional distress damages are war-
ranted in employment discrimination cases under Title VII and
Section 1981, but courts do not generally require such evidence of
emotional distress in cases outside the employment context, either.
For example, in Daskalea v. District of Columbia,75 the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit relied
on Price76 in upholding an award of $350,000 for emotional dis-
tress that resulted when the plaintiff was sexually assaulted while
in jail. The court noted that neither lasting physical harm, nor ex-
pert testimony, was required, since there was unrebutted evidence
69 Id. at *4.
70 Id. at *5.
71 Id.
72 See id. (including ulcers, gastrointestinal disorders, hair loss, and headaches).
73 Id. at *6 (citing Gunby v. Penn. Elec. Co., 840 F.2d 1108, 1121-22 (3d Cir. 1988); Wil-
liams v. TransWorld Airlines, Inc., 660 F.2d 1267, 1273 (8th Cir. 1981)).
74 Id. at *7.
75 227 F.3d 433 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
76 Price v. City of Charlotte, 93 F.3d 1241 (4th Cir. 1996).
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concerning the nature of the assault and the extent of the emotional
harm that the plaintiff suffered. The court further found that the
plaintiff's emotional injuries were not surprising or unexpected
given the nature of the assault, and that "it does not take an expert
to confirm the jury's common sense with respect to both their exis-
tence and cause."" Hence, objective evidence was not required for
the jury to conclude that the plaintiff had suffered emotional harm
and that such harm was compensable.
Of course, many claims for intentional infliction of emotional
distress78 arise under state law. Even so, objective evidence of the
nature and extent of the emotional harm generally is not required.
In Ohio, for instance, a plaintiff must prove he suffered "serious
emotional distress" that was "both severe and debilitating. 79
Thus, where a plaintiff merely alleges emotional distress, without
alleging or offering evidence that the distress was severe, emo-
tional distress damages will be denied. 80 However, there is no in-
dication that courts applying Ohio law would require objective
evidence under this standard. Instead, the trier of fact must decide
whether the distress was such that "a reasonable person, normally
constituted, would be unable to cope adequately" under the cir-
cumstances.8' It is left for the trier of fact to use its common sense
to decide whether the evidence, either subjective or objective, ade-
quately supports the claim for emotional distress.
Similarly, Mississippi does not require physical or bodily in-
jury to support a claim for emotional distress. Instead, the distress
must be "so severe that no reasonable man could be expected to
endure it."'82 However, mere conclusory statements will not suf-
fice. For example, the Fifth Circuit reversed a jury award of emo-
tional damages that was based on the plaintiff's testimony that she
was "jittery, upset, unnerved, depressed, crying, emotional, morti-
fied, terribly upset, bothered tremendously, and very badly hurt. 83
This testimony, without more, was insufficient to sustain the emo-
77 Daskalea, 227 F.3d at 444.
78 This Comment does not address claims for negligent infliction of emotional distress be-
cause physical injury, or the fear thereof, is generally required. See, e.g., Shatkin v. McDonnell
Douglas Corp., 727 F.2d 202, 206-07 (2d Cir. 1984) (holding that evidence of fear of physical
injury was inadequate where it was unclear that airline passenger was aware of the impending
crash until just moments before it occurred). The issues attendant with proving physical inju-
ries, or the fear of such injuries, are outside the scope of this Comment.
79 See Wright v. MetroHealth Med. Ctr., 58 F.3d 1130, 1139 (6th Cir. 1995) (citing sev-
eral Ohio Supreme Court cases).
80 Id.
"8 Id. (citing Gagne v. N.W. Nat'l Ins. Co., 881 F.2d 309, 317 (6th Cir. 1989)).
R2 See, e.g., Burroughs v. FFP Operating Partners, L.P., 28 F.3d 543, 549 (5th Cir. 1994)
(internal quotation omitted).
83 Id.
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tional damages. 84 In making its determination, the court did rec-
ognize that a plaintiff's testimony, alone, may be sufficient to sup-
port an award of damages under Mississippi law. However, the
testimony here did not meet the relatively high standard required.85
The law in Texas is less restrictive than that in Mississippi.
To succeed on a claim for emotional distress in Texas, a plaintiff
need only testify that she suffered such ailments as insomnia,
nervousness, and paranoia as a result of the offending conduct.
Such was the testimony offered in Dean v. Ford Motor Credit
Co.,86 in which the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit found sufficient evidence to support an award of emotional
distress damages. It should be noted that state laws generally re-
quire plaintiffs to prove their emotional distress was severe.87
There is no such severity requirement for emotional distress claims
that arise under Title VII or Section 1981. Consequently, to the
extent that courts are reluctant to award damages based solely on a
plaintiff's testimony for claims of intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress under state law, courts should be more willing to
award damages for emotional distress based on such testimony
under Title VII and Section 1981.
CONCLUSION
In its recent decision in Zhang v. American Gem Seafoods,
Inc.,88 the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
stated that although objective evidence of emotional distress is not
required in the Ninth Circuit, it is required in some circuit courts
to support an award of damages for such distress. As this Com-
ment has demonstrated, that statement is not entirely true. There is
some confusion over the standard of proof required for emotional
distress damage claims; the confusion has caused courts to inter-
pret earlier decisions as requiring objective evidence when those
decisions are really based on the sufficiency of the evidence pre-
sented, whether subjective or objective. In fact, most courts do not
require objective evidence to support awards for emotional dam-
ages, as long as the plaintiff's testimony is sufficiently detailed as
to the nature and extent of the emotional harm. This is the correct
stance on the issue. As discussed supra, the Supreme Court did
not create an objective evidence requirement when deciding Carey
84 Id.
85 Id. (citing Lyons v. Zale Jewelry Co., 150 So. 2d 154, 155 (Miss. 1963)).
8 885 F.2d 300, 307-08 (5th Cir. 1989).
87 See, e.g., id; see also Burroughs, 28 F.3d at 549; Wright v. MetroHealth Med. Ctr., 58
F.3d 1130, 1139 (6th Cir. 1995).
8 339 F.3d 1020 (9th Cir. 2003).
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v. Piphus. Indeed, the language the Court used lends itself more to
the opposite interpretation: Subjective evidence, in the form of the
plaintiff's own testimony, may be sufficient as long as it convinces
the trier of fact by a preponderance of the evidence that emotional
harm was indeed sustained. Requiring objective evidence in every
instance where emotional distress is claimed would put a height-
ened burden on the plaintiff that was not intended by the Supreme
Court.
In addition, since objective evidence is not clearly required
even for claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress,
where the plaintiff is often required to prove his distress was se-
vere, no reason exists why the plaintiff in a Title VII or Section
1981 case should have to bear a higher evidentiary burden.
Granted, it seems unlikely that a plaintiff would have difficulty
presenting corroborating testimony from friends or family of the
plaintiff's emotional injuries. However, this should not be an ab-
solute requirement. Instead, as the Supreme Court noted, the trier
of fact should be reminded that mere conclusory statements will
not be sufficient to support a claim for distress. The plaintiff must
produce evidence regarding the nature and extent of the emotional
injuries that is sufficient to prove its existence by a preponderance
of the evidence. While this may include corroborating testimony
or medical expert testimony, it should not be mandated if the
plaintiff's testimony, alone, would satisfy the requirement.
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